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UCC SECTION 1-207 AND THE FULL PAYMENT
CHECK: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE CODE
AND THE COMMON LAW-WHERE DO THE
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR FIT IN?
I.

INTRODUCTION

A relatively overlooked section of the Uniform Commercial Code
[hereinafter U.C.C. or Code], section 1-207,1 which concerns performance or acceptance under reservation of rights, has recently come to the
forefront and could have a profound effect on debtor-creditor relations.'
The question which has arisen is whether U.C.C. section 1-207 should
be applied to the full payment check, thus changing the common law
doctrine of accord and satisfaction concerning the full payment check.
In the context of debtor-creditor relations, disputes often arise over
an amount due. For example, A and B enter into an agreement
whereby A agrees to furnish certain supplies and B agrees in return to
pay $200. During the course of the transaction, due to market conditions, some of the supplies have to be substituted. B claims that the
substituted supplies are only worth $100. A claims that the supplies are
substantially the same, and that B still owes $200. B, in an attempt to
compromise, sends A a check for $150 marked "payment in full." This
triggers the dilemma.
Under the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction, creditor A would have two choices.3 He could accept B's check in full payment of the claim or he could return the check and sue for the full
balance. 4 The creditor cannot retain the check and sue for the balance. 5
The burden is placed on the creditor to choose between these two alternatives. The debtor's position is clear. In sending a check marked "pay-

1. U.C.C. § 1-207 states:
A party who with explicit reservation of rights performs or promises performance or assents to performance in a manner demanded or offered by the other party does not thereby
prejudice the rights reserved. Such words as "without prejudice," "under protest" or the
like are sufficient.
2. William Hawkland, one of the most widely cited authors on the subject of § 1-207, has
observed: "[i]f applied literally, this section could drastically alter the well-settled legal rights and
duties of a debtor and creditor involved in one particular commercial transaction, namely, the
accord and satisfaction by way of the 'conditional check'." Hawkland, The Effect of U.C.C. § I207 on the Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction by Conditional Check, 74 COMM. L.J. 329 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Hawkland].
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4-12, at 154 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as CALAMARI & PERILLO].
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ment in full," he has presented the creditor a "take it or leave it"
offer. 6
On the other hand, if U.C.C. section 1-207 is applied to the same
set of facts, the burden shifts to the debtor. Under the Code, the creditor can retain the check "under protest" and with "full reservation of
rights" and still sue for the balance.7 Hence, the debtor can send a full
payment check in an amount which he considers a fair compromise,
$150, hoping that the creditor will elect to accept the check in full
settlement of the claim. Although the creditor upon receipt of an
amount larger than the debtor admits is due might be less inclined to
sue for the balance than if he received only what the debtor claimed
was due, the debtor nevertheless risks the chance that the creditor will
retain the larger amount and still sue for the balance. In other words,
in sending $150 the debtor takes the risk that the creditor will receive
$50 more than the debtor thinks he owes, and that the creditor will
additionally sue for the remaining $50 he originally claimed. The
debtor's other choice is to send only the amount he admits is due, $100,
and wait for the creditor to sue for the balance. The potential for litigation is even greater in this instance because the debtor has made no
attempt to compromise with the creditor; on the other hand, the debtor
has not taken the risk of placing in the hands of the creditor any sums
greater than the precise amount he admits is due. Consequently, be-.
cause of these poor alternatives left open to the debtor when section 1207 is applied to this type of situation, the informal compromise of
accord and satisfaction is impaired. 8
Perhaps of greater consequence to the debtor or the creditor is the
question whether the Code will be applied to the situation. The uncertainty is harder to deal with than either of the two situations described
above. This issue basically lay dormant until 1976,1 and case law is still
unsettled. Consequently, no clear majority or minority position has
emerged. Nevertheless, because of the impact on the debtor-creditor
relationship, the issue whether section 1-207 applies to the full payment
check needs to be acknowledged and resolved. 10 Strong policy favoring

6. Id.
7. Id. at 155.
8. Hawkland, supra note 2, at 330. "With the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code,
the validity of the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction in the case under discussion
[the full payment check] is seriously in doubt." Id.
, 247 N.W.2d 490 (1976). See Note, Does U.C.C.
S.D. 9. Scholl v. Tallman, Section 1-207 Apply to the Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction by Conditional Check?, 11
CREIGHTON L. REV. 515 (1977) (where the author discusses whether other jurisdictions should
follow Scholl, the first case to hold that § 1-207 applied to the full payment check) [hereinafter
cited as Does Section 1-207 Apply].
10. See Note, Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code Not Intended to Apply to
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the preservation of accord and satisfaction with the full payment
check,1 1 along with the legislative history of section 1-20711 and recent
case law,"a suggest that section 1-207 was not originally meant to be
applied and should not be applied to the full payment check.
II.

THE GENERAL BACKGROUND OF THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE
OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION AS IT RELATES TO THE FULL
PAYMENT CHECK

An accord is an agreement in which a party agrees to accept some
new, different performance in satisfaction of another party's existing
obligation.14 A satisfaction is the performance of the accord agreement.15 A check which is clearly marked "offered in full settlement of
disputed claim," a full payment check, constitutes an offer for an accord.'6 When the check is accepted and deposited the accord is ac1
cepted and the satisfaction takes place. 7
Certain rules regarding the use of full payment checks have arisen
because an accord is governed by ordinary contract principles.' 8 Consequently, there must be mutual assent and consideration.' 9 Mutual assent requires that the'notation on a full payment check be clear so that
the creditor receiving the check has the same understanding of the use
to which the check is to be put as does the debtor who tenders it.20 The
consideration in an accord is the act of compromising by each party."
The debtor pays more than he admits is due while the creditor accepts
less.2 2 Consequently, the majority of jurisdictions28 require that a debt
be unliquidated a4 and disputed in good faith in order to find the requiDoctrine of Accord and Satisfaction, 15 LAND & WATER L. REv. 737, 742 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as 1-207 Not Intended, Accord and Satisfaction].
11. See note 97 and accompanying text infra.
12. See note 47 and accompanying text infra.
13. See note 83 and accompanying text infra.
14. Hawkland, supra note 2, at 329. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351
(Tent. Draft No. 13, 1978).
15. Hawkland, supra note 2, at 329.
16. 1 AM. JuR. 2d Accord and Satisfaction § 14 (1962).
17. Id. at § 18.
18. Hawkland, supra note 2, at 329.
19. 1 AM. JUR. 2d Accord and Satisfaction §§ 11, 12 (1962).
20. Id. at § 15.
21. 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 121 (1964).
22. But see CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 5, § 4-12, at 155 (where debtor sends only
the amount he admits that he owes, the majority still deem the debt to be unliquidated and find
consideration).
23. See, e.g., Longstreth v. Halter, 122 Ark. 212, 183 S.W. 177 (1916); Potter v. Pacific
Coast Lumber Co. of Cal., 37 Cal. 2d 592, 234 P.2d 16 (1951); Alcorn v. Arthur, 230 Ky. 509, 20
S.W.2d 276 (1929); Nordling v. Whelchel Mines Co., 90 Idaho 213, 409 P.2d 398 (1965); Platt v.
Penetryn Sys., Inc., 151 Ohio St. 451, 86 N.E.2d 600 (1949).
24. "A liquidated debt is either a fixed sum or one that can be calculated from figures at
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site consideration. 5 If a debt is liquidated or disputed in bad faith, for
example, if there is no bona fide dispute, the debtor is merely paying
something he already owed and is not giving anything up; hence, there
is no new consideration for an accord.2
The most difficult question at common law is whether the requirement of mutual assent is met when a creditor accepts a full payment
check with words of protest. Justice Cardozo succinctly answered this
question in Hudson v. Yonkers Fruit Co. 27 : "Protest will . . . be unavailing if the money is retained. What is said is overriden by what is
done, and assent is imputed as an inference of law." 28 Cardozo later
noted in Hudson that the use of a full payment check in violation of its
terms would constitute an act of conversion.
A New Jersey court has aptly summarized the requirements for an
accord and satisfaction at common law as follows:
When a claim is unliquidated and a check is tendered in full settlement,
giving the creditor notice of this condition, the creditor's retention and
use of the check constitutes an accord and satisfaction. .

.

. [T] he credi-

the check for
tor is deemed to have accepted this condition by depositing
30
collection notwithstanding any obligation or alteration.

III.

THE GENERAL BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF

U.C.C. SECTION 1-207

An analysis of the language of section 1-207 and its legislative
history aid in determining whether section 1-207 was intended to apply
to the full payment check. U.C.C. section 1-207 provides that:
A party who with explicit reservation of rights performs or promises performance or assents to performance in a manner demanded or offered by
hand." Note, Accord and Satisfaction Under Uniform Commercial Code Section 1-207: Scholl v.
Tallman, 38 OHIO Sr. L.J. 921, 922 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Accord and Satisfaction under
U.C.C.]. A debt is unliquidated when the amount due can not be calculated or is in dispute. Id.
25. See Comment, Accord and Satisfaction. Conditional Tender by Check Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 18 BUFF. L. REV. 539, 541 (1969). (hereinafter cited as Conditional
Tender]. "A minority of jurisdictions ... provide either by statute or decision that if there is a
written receipt of agreement to accept partial payment even a liquidated debt will be discharged."
Id. Accord, American Food Purveyors, Inc. v. Lindsay Meats, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 383, 265 S.E.2d
325 (1980).
26. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 5, § 4-12, at 154.
27. 258 N.Y. 168, 179 N.E. 373 (1932).
28. Id. at 171, 179 N.E. at 374. But see Does Section 1-207 Apply, supra note 9, at 518
(noting a minority view where the creditor's acceptance must be made expressly and without
protest.) See, e.g., Siegele v. Des' Moines Mut. Hail Ins. Ass'n, 28 S.D. 142, 132 N.W. 697
(1911).
29. 258 N.Y. 172, 179 N.E. 375 (1932). Any use of a full payment check other than in full
satisfaction of a claim would constitute a use of the check in violation of its terms.
30. Chancellor, Inc. v. Hamilton Appliance Co., 175 N.J. Super. 345, 347, 418 A.2d 1326,
1327 (1980).
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the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved. Such
words as "without prejudice", "under protest" or the like are sufficient.8 1
This section first appeared in the Proposed Final Draft of 19502 and
has remained unchanged through the current official version. 3
Of particular interest is the co-existence of sections 1-207 and 3802(3) in the 1950 and 1952 drafts." In the 1952 Official Draft, section 3-802(3) provided:
Where a check or similar payment instrument provides that it is in full
satisfaction of an obligation the payee discharges the underlying obligation by obtaining payment of the instrument unless he establishes that
the original obligor has taken unconscionable advantage in the
circumstances.3 5
This section codified the common law where there was a disputed and
unliquidated debt by providing that the underlying obligation is discharged by obtaining payment of,the check unless the payee establishes
that the original obligor has taken unconscionable advantage of him;
however, section 3-802(3) changed the common law with regard to undisputed and unliquidated debts in that it speaks only of a check in
"full satisfaction of an obligation" without qualifying the term obligation or requiring that it be unliquidated or undisputed.3 6 The 1956 Official Draft subsequently deleted section 3-802(3).)
Sections 1-207 and 3-802(3) coexisted in the two drafts without
any cross reference.3 8 The Official Comments to section 3-802(3) make
it clear that it was meant to apply to accord and satisfaction. 9 It is
doubtful that the authors of the Code intended that two section affect
the same thing.40 This in turn suggests that section 1-207 was not originally intended to apply to the full payment check at all."1 In addition,
the deletion of section 3-802(3) does not necessarily imply that section
1-207 now controls these types of transactions because the official com-

31.
32.

U.C.C. § 1-207.
Id. (1952 proposed final draft).

33.

Rosenthal, Discord and Dissatisfaction: Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial

Code, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 48, 58 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Rosenthal]. Rosenthal, in what is
probably the most frequently cited article on § 1-207, includes a comprehensive section dealing
with the legislative history of § 1-207.
34. Id. at 60.
35. U.C.C. § 3-802(3) (1952 version).
36. Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 59 (Rosenthal's comments are based on a study by the
New York State Law Revision Commission).
37. Id. at 60.
38. Id.
39. U.C.C. § 3-802, Official Comment 5 (1949 draft).
40.

Accord and Satisfaction under U.C.C., supra note 24, at 928.

41.

Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 61.
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ments to section 1-207 make no mention of such a change."2 "The most
plausible explanation is that the drafter3 of the Code decided to leave
accord and satisfaction to the courts."'
Another source of interpretation for section 1-207 is the Official
Comments to the Code. Official Comment 1 to section 1-207 states:
This section provides machinery for the continuation of performance
along the lines contemplated by the contract despite a pending dispute,
by adopting the mercantile device of going ahead with delivery, acceptance, or payment "without prejudice", "under protest", "with reservation of all our rights" and the like.4

Although the Official Comments usually point out any changes the section would make on the existing law, the comment to section 1-207
fails to note any such change.' 5 Once again, this implies that section 1207 was never intended to apply to the full payment check.4" In a frequently cited article, Albert Rosenthal noted that "if so fundamental a
change in the law of accord and satisfaction had been intended it seems
likely that it would have been articulated-particularly during the critical years in the mid-fifties, when the fate of the Code probably hung
in precarious balance .... "14
Although the above mentioned history strongly suggests that section 1-207 was not intended to apply to full payment checks, several
state annotations suggest just the opposite.48 The first of these interpre-

42. See note 44 and accompanying text infra. If § 1-207 was meant to fill the void when
3-802(3) was deleted, this should have been mentioned in the Official Comments to § 1-207 in
the year § 3-802(3) was deleted, 1957. Accord and Satisfaction under U.C.C.. supra note 24, at
928. However, "section 1-207 had the same comments in 1957 as in 1950 when the section was
first introduced." Id.
43. Id. at 928-29.
44. U.C.C. § 1-207, Official Comment 1.
45. Hawkland, supra note 2, at 331.
Since the Official Comments do, as a practice, point out any significant changes which a
section makes in existing law, a strong argument can be made that the failure of the comment to 1-207 to mention such a.sweeping change as would be caused by the application of
the section to the present case indicates that no such result was intended.

§

Id.
46. Id. Hawkland offers a possible interpretation of Official Comment 1:
This language might suggest that the section is not designed to alter the law of accord and
satisfaction but to permit parties to go ahead with the performance of a contract without
the fear of waiver. An accord and satisfaction . . . involves a new contract, not the "contemplated" performance of the original contract.
Id. (emphasis original).
47. Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 61.
48. The Delaware comment to § 1-207 states:
"In particular it [§ 1-2071 makes possible avoidance of the sometimes harsh effect of cases
holding that a debt is discharged in its entirety by acceptance of part payment which the debtor
tenders as full payment of an unliquidated claim." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1-207 (1975).
The Florida Code Comment notes:
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tations appeared when the New York Commission on Uniform State
Laws sent its report, including annotations of each section, recommending that New York enact the Code."' The portion dealing with
section 1-207 stated that "[the Code rule would permit, in code-covered transactions, the acceptance of a part performance or payment
tendered in full settlement without requiring the acceptor to gamble
with his legal right to demand the balance of the peformance as payment."50 The current New York annotation is substantively the same.' 1
Despite the clarity in these state annotations, it must be emphasized
that these annotations only appear in the following five states: Delaware, Florida, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and New York.52
IV.
A.

CASE LAW

Cases Applying Section 1-207 to the Full Payment Check

The first case directly dealing with the effect of section 1-207 on
the full payment check was decided in 1976 in Scholl v. Tallman." In
Scholl, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the conditional
endorsement of a check constitutes an explicit reservation of rights and
is not acceptance in writing as required for an accord and satisfaction
"This section [§ 1-207] offers a device of considerable practical value, in permitting a party
to accept whatever he can get in payment, performance etc. without having to gamble with his
legal rights to demand the balance of the payment." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 671.1-207 (West 1966).
The Minnesota comment specifies that "this section [§1-207] does not preclude an accord
and satisfaction or a waiver if one party offers to give or receive performance only on his terms
and the other party assents and goes ahead without explicit protest or reservation of rights."
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.1-207 (West 1966) (emphasis original).
The New Hampshire comment to § 1-207 explains:
As to the common law, the section would, in code-covered situations, permit acceptance of
a part performance or payment tendered in full settlement without the acceptor gambling
with his legal right to demand the remainder of the performance or payment, a course
impossible now save where the part tendered is either liquidated or undisputed.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:1207 (1961).
For the New York comment see note 51 infra.
49. Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 61-62 provides the historical background regarding the
report of the New York Commission on Uniform State Laws and § 1-207.
50. Id. (Rosenthal quotes from the Rep. of the Comm'n on Uniform State Laws to Legislature of State of N.Y. 19-20 (1961)).

51. The current New York annotation reads as follows:
This section permits a party involved in a Code-covered transaction to accept whatever he
can get by way of payment, performance, etc., without losing his rights to demand the
remainder of the goods, to set-off a failure of quality, or to sue for the balance of the
payment, so long as he explicitly reserves his rights.
N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 1-207 (McKinney 1964).
52. See note 48 supra.
53. S.D. -, 247 N.W.2d 490 (1976). Two earlier cases said that § 1-207 applied to
the full payment check. Hanna v. Perkins, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 1044 (Westchester [N.Y.] County Ct.
1965) (dictum). Baillie Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp., 4 N.C. App. 342, 167 S.E.2d 85
(1969) (alternative holding).
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under the South Dakota statute." In rendering its decision, the court
relied on dicta in two earlier cases, 5 ' the Commission on Uniform State
Laws,"6 and professors White and Summers.57 Without explicitly mentioning the effect this decision would have on the debtor, the court discarded the defendant's argument that the application of section 1-207
to the full payment check would seriously debilitate the use of accord
and satisfaction." "This doctrine has long been an effective method of
avoiding litigation; it will still serve that function whenever rights are
not explicitly reserved."' 9 It is doubtful, however, that a conscientious
creditor would ever accept a full payment check without routinely reserving his rights.
The longest line of authority applying section 1-207 to the full
payment check is in New York. The first New York case to apply section 1-207, Lange-Finn Construction Co. v. Albany Steel & Iron Supply Co., 6O primarily relied on the New York Annotations in holding
that the Code changed the common law. 1 Although the underlying
policy is not discussed, the court recognized the plight of the creditor
when faced with the decision whether to retain money in hand or return it in the hope of a greater amount. 6 2 The New York cases following Lange-Finn have consistently adhered to its holding.' 3

' , 247 N.W.2d 490, 492 (1976). Scholl involved a dispute over an
S.D.
54. amount due for construction work done for the defendants. The plaintiff cashed a full payment
check received from the defendant after noting "restriction of payment in full refused." Id. at
247 N.W.2d at 491. The plaintiff then commenced suit for the balance.
The South Dakota statute outlining an accord and satisfaction is S.D. LAWS ANN. § 20-7-4
(1980). The South Dakota counterpart to § 1-207 is S.D. LAWS § 57A-1-207 (1980).
55. See note 53 supra.
56. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
57. White and Summers believe that § 1-207 changes an accord and satisfaction when a
payee accepts with protest. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 13-21, at 547 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS]. White and Summers view this issue entirely from the creditor's viewpoint. Id. at 544-45. In
concluding that § 1-207 changes the common law, they rely on the report of the New York Commission on Uniform State Laws, see note 50 and accompanying text supra, and the earliest cases
dealing with § 1-207, namely Baillie, Hanna, and Scholl, see note 53 and accompanying text
supra.
247 N.W.2d 290, 292-93 (1976).
S.D ....
58. 59. Id.
60. 94 Misc.2d 15, 403 N.Y.S.2d l012 (1978).
61. Id. at 18, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 1014. See note 51 supra for the text of the New York
Annotation.
62. The court's concern for the creditor is apparent in the language of an additional portion
of the New York Annotations quoted by the court: "'The Code rule would permit, in Codecovered transactions, the acceptance of a part performance or payment tendered in full settlement
without requiring the acceptor to gamble with his legal right to demand the balance of the performance or payment.'" 94 Misc.2d 15, 18, 403 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1014 (emphasis added).
63. Accord, Braun v. C.E.P.C. Distribs., Inc., 77 A.D.2d 358, 433 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1980);
Kroulee Corp. v. A. Klein & Co., Inc., 103 Misc.2d 441, 426 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1980); Ayer v. Sky
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The holdings of the New York and South Dakota courts have been
followed in only a limited number of cases." A Florida case, Miller v.
Jung,6 is of some interest because it articulates the policy and purpose
in applying the Code to change the common law. The Code's approach
in section 1-207 "frees up or minimizes impediments to the flow of
commercial paper while reserving the rights of the immediate parties."' ' Thus, it is the creditor who primarily benefits from this
arrangement.
Only three jurisdictions hold that section 1-207 changes the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction." The rationale of this position, while centering on state annotations to the Code and White and
Summers, reflects the desire to permit creditors to accept whatever
payments they can receive from a debtor without forfeiting their rights
to collect and sue for any outstanding disputed amounts.
B. Cases Adhering to the Common Law Doctrine of Accord and
Satisfaction
Cases which apply the common law and explicitly reject the appli-

Club, Inc., 70 A.D.2d 863, 418 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1979).
64. Accord, Simpson v. Norwesco, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D.S.D. 1977); Bivins v.
White Dairy, Ala. App. - 378 So. 2d 1122 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979); Miller v. Jung, 361
So. 2d 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
65. 361 So. 2d' 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). Contra Eder v. Yvette B. Gervey Interiors,
Inc., 407 So. 2d 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Eder, a December 1981 case in the Fourth
District Court of Appeal of Florida, creates a sharp conflict with its sister, the second district, in
Miller v. Jung. The fourth district held that § 1-207 should not be used to defeat an accord and
satisfaction. 407 So. 2d at 314. It is particularly interesting that in making its decision, the fourth
district acknowledged and rejected the Florida Code Comment, supra note 48. Because the court
in Eder expressly certified a conflict with Miller, this conflict will undoubtedly be placed in the lap
of the Florida Supreme Court to resolve.
66. 361 So. 2d at 789.
67. Alabama, New York, and South Dakota, see notes 54, 60, 63 and 64 supra. The Second
District Court of Appeals of Florida has also held that § 1-207 applies to the full payment check;
however, Florida's Fourth District has expressly held the opposite. See note 65 supra. But see Del
Duca, Handling "FullPayment" Checks, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 195 (1981). Del Duca contends that the
majority view is "that Section 1-207 applies to 'full payment' check transactions." Id. at 197. Del
Duca bases his conclusion on decisions from South Dakota, New York, Florida, North Carolina
and Oregon as well as the explanatory comments or annotations to the Code in Delaware, Florida,
New Hampshire, New York, and Minnesota. Id. It should be noted that the Oregon decision
hinted that the U.C.C. might change the common law, but it did not base its decision on the
Code. Kilander v. Blickle Co., 280 Or. 425, 429, 571 P.2d 503, 505 (1977). The case was remanded because of a factual issue. Id. In addition, Del Duca relies on Baillie Lumber Co. v.
Kincaid Carolina Corp. as authority for North Carolina. 4 N.C. App. 342, 167 S.E.2d 85 (1969).
As noted earlier, note 36 supra, this reading of Baillie is based on dicta or an alternative holding.
Additionally, Del Duca fails to recognize two recent North Carolina cases which distinguish Baillie and hold that § 1-207 "does not apply to a check tendered in full payment of a disputed
claim." Brown v. Coastal Truckways, Inc., 44 N.C. App. 454, 458, 261 S.E.2d 266, 269 (1980).
Accord, Barber v. White, 46 N.C. App. 110, 264 S.E.2d 385 (1980).
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cation of section 1-207 have only recently been decided.6 8 The majority
of cases dealing with accord and satisfaction have not dealt with section 1-207 at all 9 or have postponed decision on the issue because of
limited precedent and disagreement among legal scholars.7 0 Among the
cases which have in fact ruled on this issue and hold in favor of the
common law, the line of reasoning has been based on three factors: (1)
the language of section 1-207; (2) the legislative history; and (3)
policy.
An interpretation of section 1-207 based on the plain meaning of
the language of the statute has been held to render section 1-207 inapplicable to the full payment check.71 The Wyoming Supreme Court in
Jahn v. Burns72 identified the pertinent portion of the statute as follows: "[a] party who with explicit reservation of rights . . .assents to
performance in a manner . . . offered by the other party does not
thereby prejudice the rights reserved. ' 78 Based on the plain meaning
rule, the court found that "[t]he manner offered here is part payment
conditioned on it being in full settlement. In an attempt to reserve
rights, plaintiff did not 'assent to performance in the manner offered.' ",74 Thus, the court held that section 1-207 was not meant to
7
apply to the full payment check.

5

68. See, e.g., American Food Purveyors, Inc. v. Lindsay Meats, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 383, 265
S.E.2d 325 (1980); Chancellor, Inc. v. Hamilton Appliance Co., 175 N.J. Super. 345, 418 A.2d
1326 (1980); Barber v. White, 46 N.C. App. 110, 264 S.E.2d 385 (1980); Brown v. Coastal
Truckways, Inc., 44 N.C. App. 454, 261 S.E.2d 266 (1980); Gallagher Lumber Co. v. Shapiro,
137 Vt. 139, 400 A.2d 984 (1979); State Dep't of Fisheries v. J-Z Sales Corp., 25 Wash. App.
671, 610 P.2d 390 (1980); Van Sistine v. Tollard, 95 Wis.2d 678, 291 N.W.2d 636 (1980); Jahn
v. Burns, 593 P.2d 828 (Wyo. 1979).
69. This can be inferred from the fact that only four jurisdictions have held that the Code
applies to the full payment check, see note 67 supra, and only seven jurisdictions have explicitly
held that it does not, see note 68 supra.The remaining jurisdictions have continued to apply the
common law without reference to the Code. See Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 67-68.
70. See Fritz v. Marantette, 404 Mich. 329, 273 N.W.2d 425 (1978). The court in Fritz
withheld "adopting a particular judicial interpretation of § 1-207 at this time" and decided the
case on common law principles. Id. at 338, 273 N.W.2d at 429. See also Kilander v. Blickle Co.,
280 Or. 425, 571 P.2d 503 (1977) (Discussion of the issue whether § 1-207 applied to the full
payment check, but no decision rendered).
71. See, e.g., Jahn v. Burns, 593 P.2d 828, 830 (Wyo. 1979); Brown v. Coastal Truckways,
Inc., 44 N.C. App. 454, 458, 261 S.E.2d 266, 269 (1980).
72. 593 P.2d 828, 830 (Wyo. 1979).
73. Id. (emphasis original).
74. Id. (emphasis original). Contra, American Food Purveyors, Inc. v. Lindsay Meats, Inc.,
153 Ga. App. 383, 265 S.E.2d 325 (1980). The Georgia appellate court rejects the reasoning of
Jahn, asserting that "assent to performance" is not to be equated with "acceptance of the condition." The court in American Food Purveyors goes on to uphold the common law rule, but does so
only on the basis of stare decisis, stating that "the continued adherence to the traditional rule
concerning the full-payment check is questionable as a matter of legal theory." Id. at 386, 265
S.E.2d at 327.
75. Jahn v. Burns, 593 P.2d 828, 830 (Wyo. 1979).
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The legislative history of section 1-207 has also been held to
render section 1-207 inapplicable to the full payment check.7 The
courts have looked to the Official Comments of the Code and the observations and interpretations of the Comments made by William Hawkland in an often cited article.7 In addition, Rosenthal and his discussion dealing with section 3-802(3) have been cited.7 8 In Chancellor,
Inc. v. Hamilton Appliance Co.,7 9 the New Jersey District Court additionally reviewed the legislative history in New Jersey. The New Jersey

Study Comment, unlike the New York annotation, did not mention the
rule on accord and satisfaction.8" The court concluded that "[i]t would
appear that the Legislature adopted § 1-207 presupposing that it reflected existing law." 81

The policy rejecting the application of section 1-207 to the full
payment check recognizes that a debtor's attempt to make a good faith
offer to compromise would be futile under the Code. As the court in
Chancellor noted:
[i]f the court were to conclude that a creditor could reserve his rights on
a 'full payment check,' a convenient and informal device for the resolution of disagreements in the business community would be seriously impeded. The court is hesitant to impair such a valuable, informal settlement tool where there is no indication that the legislature intended that
result. 82

Although only a limited number of jurisdictions have explicitly upheld the common law, they represent the most recent trend. 88 While
the rationale of these cases rests on the language or the legislative his-

tory of section 1-207, this trend favoring the common law most proba-

76. See, e.g., Chancellor, Inc. v. Hamilton Appliance Co., 175 N.J. Super. 345, 418 A.2d
1326 (1980) (where the court looks at the comment to § 1-207 and its legislative history and finds
no intent "to redefine the law of accord and satisfaction and to restrict the use of the 'full payment check'."). Id. at 349, 418 A.2d at 1329.
77. Id. at 350-51, 418 A.2d at 1329. See notes 45 and 46 and accompanying text supra.
78. 175 N.J. Super. at 351-52, 418 A.2d at 1329-30. See notes 34-41 and accompanying
text supra.
79. 175 N.J. Super. 345, 418 A.2d 1326 (1980).
80. New Jersey Study Comment, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:1-207 (West 1962).
81. 175 N.J. Super. at 350, 418 A.2d at 1329.
82. Id. at 352, 418 A.2d at 1330.
83. Comparing the dates of the decisions in notes 53, 60, 63 and 64 supra, with note 68
supra indicates the first of these.decisions, which appeared in the late 1970's, favored applying the
Code, while the majority of the decisions appearing in 1980 (note 68 supra) upheld the common
law. See Note, Commercial Transactions - Michigan Rejects UCC and Adopts Minority Common Law Standard for Conditional Check Accord and Satisfaction, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 1067
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Michigan Rejects U.C.C.] (which also notes that "[t]he recent trend
. . .has indicated the reluctance of courts to apply 1-207 to conditional check accord and satisfaction.").
at 1087.
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bly results from the desire to preserve the use of the full payment check
as a device to achieve an accord and satisfaction.
V.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN APPLYING SECTION

1-207

TO THE

FULL PAYMENT CHECK

A.

Impact on the Creditor

Under the traditional doctrine of accord and satisfaction, the creditor faced with a full payment check must either accept the check in
full settlement of the claim or return it." However, as Rosenthal admits, "not all debtors are under dogs." 85 It is possible that a powerful
debtor, for example, an insurance company, could force a weaker creditor to accept a lesser sum because he needed the funds immediately
and could not afford to wait and sue for the entire amount due.8 6 White
and Summers characterize the use of the full payment check as "an
exquisite form of commercial torture on the payee.187 Hawkland suggests that "[i]f this viewpoint is accepted, section 1-207 of the U.C.C.
might be justified as an effort to balance the scales." 8 8
If section 1-207 is applied to the full payment check, the creditor
no longer has the problem of election. He can simply accept the check
with explicit reservation of his rights8" and still retain the right to sue
for any outstanding balance.
At this point it is interesting to note the observations
made by another author about the inherent protections the common law doctrine of
accord and satisfaction affords a creditor from an overreaching
debtor. 90 The author initially notes that accord and satisfaction only
applies in limited circumstances, namely, when the disputed debt is unliquidated.9 1 She then points out that "the dispute must be made in
good faith."" In addition, the creditor must have reasonable notice

84. See note 5 supra.
85. Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 55.
86. Id.
87. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 57, § 13-21, at 544. Rosenthal answers the charge of
White and Summers. "Assuming, however, parties of equal bargaining power negotiating in good
faith at arm's length, it is not clear why this torture is any more exquisite than that induced by
any settlement offer proposing more than the offeree is sure he would receive but less than he
thinks he deserves." Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 56.
88. Hawkland, supra note 2, at 332.
89. The Code states that in order for a payee to explicitly reserve his right "[sluch words;
as 'without prejudice', 'under protest' or the like are sufficient." U.C.C. § 1-207.
90. Does Section 1-207 Apply, supra note 9, at 525. The author stresses the policy considerations underlying the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, as well as the inherent protection it
contains for creditors against overreaching debtors. Id. at 527.
91. Id. at 525.
92. Id.
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that the check is intended to be in full satisfaction of the debt.98 Finally, an accord can be set aside on the grounds of fraud or mistake."
These protections would permit a creditor to retain a full payment
check without affecting an accord if, for example, the check was tendered in bad faith on an undisputed amount, or where the creditor was
unaware that the check was tendered in full settlement. Notwithstanding these protections, the creditor who needs immediate cash and cannot afford the time to wait and sue is left unaided by the common law.
B.

Impact on the Debtor

Under section 1-207 the debtor will no longer be able to tender a
full payment check on a "take it or leave it basis."95 The debtor will
always be faced with the risk that the creditor will accept the check
under reservation of rights. It would certainly be unrealistic to expect a
creditor to return a check under the Code. Consequently, the use of the
full payment check would be seriously impaired."
If the full payment check becomes ineffective, an informal, easy,
inexpensive, and convenient method of compromise would be lost.'
This can only lead to more litigation, increasing the burden on the
courts.98 On the other hand, the use of the full payment check under
the common law favors the private resolution of disputes, ultimately
benefiting the public at large. 99
The impact of section 1-207 on the underlying relationship between the debtor and the creditor should not be overlooked. 1 "° Although under the Code, the creditor no longer must choose between
two not ideal but not unreasonable choices, the burden shifts to the
debtor who really has no plausible choice at all. Realistically, a debtor
who in good faith disputes an unliquidated debt must resort to litiga93. Id.
94. Id. at 526.
95. See note 7 and accompanying text supra. See Conditional Tender, supra note 25, at
543 ("UCC 1-207 seems to provide the creditor with the means to reap the benefits of the tender
while permitting him to ignore the condition upon which the check is submitted."). Id.
96. See note 8 supra.
97. Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 57.
98. Conditional Tender, supra note 25, at 549. In a Note discussing the conditional (or full
payment) check under the Code, the author points out that if the informal method of settlement
through an accord and satisfaction disappears, such controversies will have to be brought to the
courts for settlement. Id. at 549-50.
99. Hawkland, supra note 2, at 332.
[T]here is much to be said for rules of law that facilitate the private resolution of disputes.
Whatever other merits or demerits are assigned to the conditioned check, no one can deny
that its use has produced the settlement of many cases to the great advantage of the commercial world and the public at large.
Id.
100. by
SeeeCommons,
Rosenthal, supra
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tion himself, or pay only the amount he feels is due and wait to. be
sued. The tendering of some greater amount in a genuine offer of compromise would be futile. Thus, under the Code, the debtor must bear
all the risks with few options.
C.

General Policies of the Code

In light of the impact section 1-207 would have on the common
law if applied to the full payment check, it is useful to look at it in
terms of the general policies of the Code. Section 1-102(2) states:
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions. 101
As noted by another author, the application of section 1-207 to the
full payment check, changing the common law doctrine of accord and
satisfaction,102 does not further these policies.103 Far from simplifying
or clarifying the law, this use of section 1-207 only adds complexity. 1 "
Certainly, the custom and usage of the full payment check is being
changed.'"5 Finally, the once virtually universal doctrine of accord and
satisfaction with the full payment check is upset and eliminated. 1 "6
VI.

CONCLUSION

The full payment check is a useful, convenient device whereby a
debtor can tender a good faith offer of compromise without fear that
101.
102.

U.C.C. § 1-102(2).
U.C.C. § 1-103 states: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the

principles of law and equity, .

.

. shall supplement its provisions."

In State Dep't of Fisheries v. J-Z Sales Corp., 25 Wash. App. 671, 610 P.2d 390 (1980), the
Washington appellate court said that § 1-103 requires "that the principles of law and equity are
not to be displaced by particular provisions of the Code unless done so explicitly by the Code." Id.
at -,
610 P.2d at 395. Consequently, in deciding whether § 1-207 should apply to the full
payment check, the court held: "The statute does not explicitly supersede the law pertaining to
accord and satisfaction, and it should not be inferred as doing so." Id. at -, 610 P.2d at 396.
Therefore, § 1-207 was deemed inapplicable to the situation.
103.

1-207 Not Intended, Accord and Satisfaction,supra note 10, at 747. In a note discuss-

ing Jahn v. Burns, 593 P.2d 828 (Wyo. 1979) (a case holding that § 1-207 does not apply to the
full payment check), the author states, in support of the decision reached by the Wyoming Supreme Court, this interpretation of § 1-207 "fosters the growth of the policies in section 1-102 of
the Code by keeping the doctrine of accord and satisfaction as it now stands, intact." Id. at 748.
Rosenthal, also points to the clash between § 1-207 and the basic purposes in § 1-102. Rosenthal,
supra note 33, at 64.
104.

1-207 Not Intended, Accord and Satisfaction, supra note 10, at 747.

105. Id.
106. Id.
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his offer will be rejected while his check is retained.
Based on practical policy reasons, section 1-207 should not be applied to the full payment check changing the common law doctrine of
accord and satisfaction. If the condition on a full payment check can
simply be negated with words of protest, this method of compromise
will become a thing of the past. In this sense, the Code discourages
private resolution of disputes.
The ultimate effectiveness of the Code as applied here is questionable. If the goal is to allow the creditor to collect all that he can without jeopardizing his right to sue for more, one must wonder how many
debtors in the future will be willing to send a check at all in amounts
above that admittedly due. Under the Code no conscientious creditor
would ever accept a check without routinely placing words of protest on
it. Certainly, no conscientious debtor in the same situation would risk
sending a check in compromise of a disputed claim for more than the
precise amount he conceded was due; this is because the creditor could
reject the debtor's offer of compromise and yet still retain the amount
which is greater than what the debtor admits is due. In the long run,
the Code will probably achieve no more than has been accomplished
under the common law, with two exceptions. One, it would shift the
burdens and risks of the transaction from the creditor to the debtor.
Two, it would lead to increased litigation.
Susan Harrison Hendrick
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